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STATE OF NEW Y O K  
SUPREME COmT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of DARRYL SWDDELL, 
-against- 
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Pet it ioner , 
Respondent, 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-13-ST4709 LrrdexNo. 2461-13 
Appearances: DasryI Swindell 
Inmate No. 92-A- 14 12 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Sing Sing Correctional Facility 
345 Hunter Street 
Ossining, 'My 10562-5442 
Eric T. Schneiderman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Colleen D. GaIligan, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISIONI0R.DE WSUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an h a t e  at Sing Sing CorrectionaI Facility, commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated April 3 2012 to 
deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner was sentenced in 1992 to the 
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following crimes: one count of attempted murder in the 1 ‘ degree having an indeterminate 
term of 20 years to life, one count of attempted murder in the 2nd degree having an 
indeterminate term of 12 ?4 to 25 years, one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the 
Zd degree having an indeterminate term of 5 years to 15 years, and one count of assault in 
the Zd degree having an indeterminate term of 2 113 years. To 7 years. 
The petitioner argues, inter alia, that the Parole Board’s action denying release was 
predetermined, and violated the parole guidehe range (see 7 NYCRR 8002.3). In his view, 
the Parole Board improperly focused on the severity of the crimes for which he was 
incarcerated, to the exdusion of other factors. He asserts that the Parole Board’s risk and 
needs findings were erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, and violated his constitutional right 
to due process.’ He maintains that he is innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. 
He indicates that because of a medical disability2, he has not been able to complete many 
institutional programs. In petitioner’s view, the Parole Board failed to consider the statutory 
factors & Executive Law 5 2594,2, [cf), failed to consider that he has changed his life for 
the better, and overrooked the fact that he has acquired the necessary skills to find 
emg 1 oyrnent . 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“Denied - Hold for 24 months, Next appearance date: 0412014 
‘A risk and needs analysis is required under Executive Law $259-c (4). DOCCS hsls 
carried out this provision through development of a transition accountability plan YTAP”), 
coupled with use of what is referred to as the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment tool. 
2“Bacterid poisoning from medication, that has affected his brain”. 
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“Following careful, review and deliberation of your record and 
interview, this panel concludes that discretionary release is not 
presently warranted due to concern for the public safety and 
welfare. The following factors were properly weighed and 
considered. Your instant offense in December 1988 involved 
your illegal possession of a handgun. You were afforded 
probation, and thereafter in August 1990 you and a co-defendant 
fired shots at an off-duty police oficer. Your history indicates 
you were on probation at the time of the August 1990 offenses. 
Your institutional programing indicates progress and 
achievement which is noted to your credit. Your disciplinary 
record reflects four tier I3. reports. Required statutory factors 
have been considered, including your risk to the community, 
rehabilitation efforts, md your needs for successhl community 
re-entry. Yow discretionary release at this time would thus not 
be compatible with the welfare of society at large, and would 
tend to deprecate the seriousness of the instant offense9s) and 
undermine respect for the law.” 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, notreviewabk 2 , 1 0 6  AD3d 1363,1363-1364 [3d 
Dept., 20131; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 20041; Matter of 
Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 20011). 
Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part of the 
Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention & Matter of Silmon v 
Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367, 1369 [3d 
Dept., 20 11 3) .  In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the 
discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York 
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
I 
The Court finds that the*Pkole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
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paroIe interview reveals that, in addition to giving consideration to the instant offense, 
attention was also given to petitioner’s claim of misidentification and innocence. The 
Commissioners indicated that they would consider petitioner’s COMPAS ReEntry Narrative 
Assessment Instrument, which is a part of the record. The Commissioners also inquired why 
the petitioner had been treated at a nearby hospital for a builet wound in his foot on the 
evening ofthe day ofthe crimes for which he was c~nvicted.~ Attention was also given, 
during the parole interview, to the petitioner’s institutional programming, a d  the reasons 
why he was unabIe to complete ASAT or obtain a GED degree. Pursuant to a question posed 
by one of the Commissions concerning his medical condition, the petitioner indicated that 
he suffers from short term memory loss, extensive stressing, laziness, tiredness and an 
inability to concentrate on academic readings and studies. Inquiry was made by the 
Commissioners with regard to petitioner’s vocational accomplishments. It was noted that 
he had four Tier I1 disciplinary violations. Attention was paid to his release plans, including 
residing with a sister in Mount Vernon; and his intention to pursue work in computer designs 
and car designs. He was given ample opportunity to make a presentation in support of his 
release. 
The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the 
denial of parore and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law 8259-i (see Matter of 
Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 20 1 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 
19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 
3During the parole interview, the petitioner indicated that he had submitted his record to 
the Innocence Project to review DNA evidence which, he claims, would have excluded him from 
any role in the crimes for which he was convicted. 
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19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, &at the Parole Board consider the seriousness of 
the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature Matter of Matos v New York State Board 
of Parole, 87 AD3d 1193 [3d Dept., 201 11; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd 
Dept., I996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see 239 AD2d 
629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The 
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it 
considered in determining tke inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one & 
Matter of Davis v Evans, 105 AD3d 1305 [3d Dept., 2013 1; Matter of MacKenzie v Evans, 
95 AD3d 16 13 [3d Dept., 20 121; Matter of Matos v New Yo& State Board of Parole, suma; 
Matter of Young: v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 1631, 1681-1682 [3d Dept., 
20 IO]). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first 
sentence of Executive Law 8 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see 2 28 AD3d 
859 [3d Dept., 20041). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give 
considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for 
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as we11 as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the 
other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘refease is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] Iaw”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 13rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law 92594 [Z] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
The record does not support petitioner’s assertion that the decision was predetermined 
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consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent 
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument lsee Matter of 
Lue-Shing v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827,828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New 
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 (3d Dept., 20051, 
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061; Matter of Motti v Dennison, 
38 AD3d 1030, 1031 [3d Dep., 20071; Matter of GarofoIo v Dennison, 53 AD3d 734 [3d 
Dept., 20081; Matter of MacRenzie v Dennison, 55 AD3d 1092, 1193 [3d Dept., 20081). 
With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the 
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates 
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US I ,  7 [1979]; Matter of Russo v 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, u. It has been repeatedly held that 
Executive Law 5 2594 does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate 
expectation uf, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated 
by the Parole Board’s exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Bama v Travis, 239 F3d 
169, 171 [2d Cir., 2001j; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [Zd Ck., 20011; Bootke v 
Hammock, 605 F2d 66 1,664 [2d Cir., 19791; Paunetto v Hammock, 5 16 F Supp 1367,1367- 
1368 [SD NY, 19811; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,75-76, 
18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v 
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court, 
accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
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As relevant here, the 20 1 1 amendments to the Executive Law I_see L 20 1 1 ch 62, Part 
C, Subpart A, Q 3 8-b, et seq.) made two changes with respect to how parole determinations 
are made. First, fixecutive Law 5 259-c was revised to diminate mention of Division of 
Parole guidelines (see 9 NYCRR 800 1.3 fa]), in favor of requiring the Division of Parole to 
rely upon criteria that would place greater emphasis on assessing the degree to which inmates 
have been rehabilitated, and the probability that they wouId be able to remain crime-fiee if 
reIeased @ Executive Law 259-c [4]). Said section now recites: “[tlhe state board of 
parole shall [I (4) establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as 
required by law. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to 
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success 
of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining 
which inmates may be released to parole supervision” (Executive Law 25% [4], enacted in 
1; 201 1 ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 9 384). This amendment was made effective six months 
after its adoption on March 3 1,20 1 1, that is, on October 1,ZO 1 1 (see L 20 1 1, ch 62, Part C, 
Subpart A, 8 494fl). In the second change, Executive 2594 (2) (c )  was amended to 
incorporate into one section the eight factors which the Parole’ Board was to consider in 
making release determinations (see L 2Ql I ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 6 28-f-1). This 
amendment was effective immediateIy upon its adoption on March 3 I, 201 1 (see L 201 1, 
ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 5 49). However, it did not result in a substantive change in the 
criteria which the Parole Board should consider in rendering its decision. In this instance, 
as noted, a risk assessment instrument is included in the record and was considered by the 
Parole Board, The Court finds that the respondent adequately fulfilled its responsibilities 
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under Executive Law 5 259-c (4). 
With respect to petitioner's argument that he has served time in excess of the parole 
guideline range (s 9 NYCRR 8OO1.3), the guidelines "are intended only its a guide, and 
are not a substitute for the careII consideration of the many circumstances of each individual 
case" (see 9 NYCRR 800 1.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole, 
290 AD2d 907,908 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Rodriguez v Evans, 82 AD3d 1397 [3d 
Dept., 20 1 1 I). Thus, to the extent that such guidelines may still be applicable, the Court finds 
that this does nut serve as a basis to overturn the Board's decision. 
Lastly, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record & Matter of 
Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, supra? at 1364, citing Matter of Tatta v State of New 
York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]). 
The Cow has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
. them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by sepaate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
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This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decisionlorderljudgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decisiodorderljudgment and delivery of this decisionlorderljudgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: September 3 ,2013 
Troy, New York George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
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